Which projects should be …nanced through separate non-recourse loans (or limitedliability companies) and which should be bundled into a single loan? In the presence of bankruptcy costs, this conglomeration decision trades o¤ the bene…t of coinsurance with the cost of risk contamination. This paper characterize this tradeo¤ for projects with binary returns, depending on the mean, variability, and skewness of returns, the bankruptcy recovery rate, the correlation across projects, the number of projects, and their heterogeneous characteristics. In some cases, separate …nancing dominates joint …nancing, even though it increases the interest rate or the probability of bankruptcy.
Consider a …rm with access to two risky projects with positive net present value. The …rm has the choice of …nancing these projects jointly within a single company or …nancing them separately by setting up two independent companies. In either case, the …rm can …nance the projects only by borrowing from a competitive credit market through standard debt. If a company's returns fall below the debt repayment obligation, a fraction of the returns are lost because of bankruptcy costs. When should the …rm …nance the projects jointly and when separately? More generally, what is the optimal corporate structure in the presence of bankruptcy costs?
According to the conventional wisdom in corporate …nance, conglomeration should bring about a reduction in the probability of bankruptcy by allowing the …rm to use the proceeds of a successful project to save an unsuccessful one, which would have failed otherwise. By aggregating imperfectly correlated cash ‡ows, the argument goes, the …rm should be able to reduce expected bankruptcy costs and increase borrowing capacity-see Lewellen (1971) . Conventional wisdom has largely settled on the view that the purely …nancial synergies from savings in bankruptcy costs achieved through conglomeration are always positive. As aptly summarized by Brealey, Myers, and Allen's (2006, page 880) textbook, "merging decreases the probability of …nancial distress, other things equal. If it allows increased borrowing, and increased value from the interest tax shields, there can be a net gain to the merger." This paper amends this conventional view by revisiting the purely …nancial e¤ects of conglomeration in the presence of bankruptcy costs. We show that bankruptcy costs alone create a non trivial tradeo¤ for conglomeration, even abstracting from tax considerations. Our analysis clari…es conditions for when the logic of the conventional argument is reversed-sometimes when projects are …nanced jointly, failure of one project can drag down another pro…table project that would have stayed a ‡oat otherwise. We also show that this e¤ect can be so strong to make it optimal in some cases for a …rm to …nance projects separately, even though joint …nancing would involve paying a lower repayment rate or would result in a lower probability of bankruptcy.
While the literature has focused mostly on the co-insurance e¤ect of conglomeration, our analysis uncovers the risk contamination e¤ect, whereby aggregating risky assets can generate incremental distress costs. Thus we formalize Esty's (2002) argument that "this phenomenon [risk contamination] must be balanced against the bene…ts of co-insurance received from the project."
Our results have implications for the conglomeration advantages and disadvantages of mergers and acquisitions, corporate spin-o¤s, and structured …nance. Our model applies equally well to the choice of how a …rm should bundle projects …nanced through nonrecourse debt. For example, a …rm with access to two projects could …nance them either jointly or separately through two non-recourse loans. When a project is …nanced separately through non-recourse debt, if the …rm does not meet the repayment obligation on one project, creditors do not have access to the returns of the other project. Thus, our results o¤er a simple explanation for the common use of project …nance, which involves the transfer of a subset of a company's assets into a special purpose vehicle …nanced with non-recourse debt.
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To best uncover the tradeo¤ between co-insurance and risk contamination, we analyze the simplest model in which each project has binary returns, either low or high. We focus on the interesting case in which separate …nancing of a project results in default when the return is low. In that case, creditors are able to recover a fraction of the project's return, while the remaining fraction is lost due to bankruptcy costs. Perfect competition among risk-neutral creditors drives down the required repayment obligation to a level at which creditors expect to exactly recoup the initial investment outlay (partly through the full repayment in case the project's return is high and through the recovered fraction of the low return).
Next, suppose instead the two projects are …nanced jointly through a single loan.
Clearly, default will result when both projects yield a low return. The interesting case to consider is when one project has a low return and the other has a high return. Suppose …rst that the sum of these two returns is su¢ ciently high to meet the required repayment obligation to creditors. If so, the high return project saves the low return project from bankruptcy. Given that the probability of bankruptcy is reduced by joint …nancing compared to separate …nancing, creditors are forced to further reduce the required repayment obligation. This is the logic of the "good"conglomeration stressed by Lewellen (1971) .
If instead the sum of low and high returns is not su¢ ciently high to meet the required repayment obligation to creditors, conglomeration is "bad". We derive conditions on the exogenous parameters for good and bad diversi…cation to arise, taking into account that the required repayment obligation is endogenously determined by the creditors'zero pro…t condition. We full characterize when joint …nancing dominates separate …nancing, depending on the distribution of projects'returns, the recovery rate in case of bankruptcy, the correlation across projects, the number of projects, and the heterogeneous characteristics of projects.
An important practical implication of our result is that it is not always optimal for a …rm to …nance projects at the lowest repayment rate. We identify situations in which conglomeration is unpro…table, even though it entails a lower repayment rate. When the recovery rate in case of bankruptcy is su¢ ciently high, creditors are forced by competition to o¤er temptingly low repayment rates to …rms that …nance projects jointly. Given that creditors break even whether the projects are …nanced separately or jointly, the …rm acts as residual claimant of the projects'expected returns net of the bankruptcy costs. Hence, the …rm should optimally …nance the projects separately at a higher repayment rate, thereby reducing expected bankruptcy costs. Even though the repayment rate is lower with joint …nancing, the …rm bears the brunt for the ine¢ cient increase in expected bankruptcy costs associated with joint …nancing.
In terms of the literature, we depart from Modigliani and Miller's (1958) world without …nancial synergies by introducing bankruptcy costs.
2 By clarifying the conditions for the value of conglomeration, this paper contributes to a voluminous literature on the purely …nancial motives for mergers. In his discussion to Lewellen (1971) , Higgins (1971) notes that project bundling a¤ects also the riskiness of the lender's returns-we instead abstract from risk by assuming risk neutrality. Scott (1977) and Sarig (1985) show that if cash ‡ows can be negative, a …rm can exploit the shelter of limited liability by …nancing projects in separate companies. In our analysis we explicitly abstract from this limited liability e¤ect, so that the mode of …nancing does not a¤ect the payo¤ of third parties, but only that of the …rm and its creditor.
Our results are most closely related to three recent contributions to the corporate …nance literature. First, Winton (1999) in the third case of his Proposition 3.1 discusses a situation in which a bank prefers to specialize even though the repayment rate for pooled projects is lower. Despite the di¤erences in the model, our Proposition 7 on the occurrence of ugly conglomeration is similar to Winton's earlier result. Second, Inderst and Müller (2003) analyze the pros and cons of project bundling in a two-project version of Bolton and Scharfstein's (1990) dynamic model of debt. In their setting, …nancing two projects within the same company can reduce the …rm's ability to borrow when the …rm is able to make follow-up investments without having to return to the capital market. 3 This a very di¤erent channel through which bad conglomeration arises, as we explain in Appendix B.
Third, Leland (2007) shows that …nancial separation can be bene…cial when it allows a …rm to …ne tune the capital structure (mix of debt and equity) to the speci…c characteristics of projects with heterogeneous returns. 4 In our paper, instead, we explicitly rule out the possibility of re-optimizing the capital structure by requiring projects to be …nanced with debt only. In addition, we provide simple analytical results which clarify what drives the sign of the pro…tability of conglomeration.
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 formulates the model. Focusing on the baseline version of the model with two identically and independently distributed projects, Section 2 analyzes the conditions setting apart good from bad conglomeration and performs comparative statics with respect to the distribution (mean, variance, and skewness) of returns and the bankruptcy recovery rate. Section 3 analyzes the e¤ect of correlation across projects. Section 4 turns to the economics of conglomeration when the number of projects is large. Section 5 extends the analysis to the case when projects have heterogeneous returns. Section 6 shows that separate …nancing might dominate joint …nancing even if it increases the repayment rate or the probability of bankruptcy. Section 7 concludes.
Appendix A collects the proofs omitted from the text. Appendix B analyzes a dynamic version of the model with non-veri…able returns and optimal …nancial contracting.
3 See also Faure-Grimaud and Inderst (2005) . 4 A number of papers (e.g., Higgins and Schall, 1975, and McConnell, 1977) have analyzed the e¤ect of the current capital structure on merger incentives. These papers noted that, while mergers may increase total …rm value, bondholders may gain at the expense of shareholders. We abstract from such a distributional con ‡ict among (cashless) stakeholders, by considering the ex-ante choice of corporate structure by shareholders and forcing bondholders to compete and therefore obtain no surplus.
5 Our results are very di¤erent from those of Sha¤er (1994) , who studies the e¤ect of joint …nancing on the probability of joint failure. Instead, we compare the …rm's expected payo¤ when the interest rate is endogenously determined by competition among creditors.
Model
This section formulates our model of debt …nancing by a risk-neutral borrower endowed with n projects. This is the simplest possible model designed to analyze how a borrower should allocate projects to loans in a perfectly competitive credit market with bankruptcy costs. In the rest of the paper we derive results for special cases of the model. Each project i requires at t = 1 an investment outlay normalized to I = 1 and yields at t = 2 a random return r i with a binary distribution: the return is either low, r i = r The borrower needs to raise external …nance from creditors at t = 1. The borrower chooses how to group projects into separate non-recourse loans. This means that creditors on each loan have access to the returns of all projects they …nance through that loan, but they do not have access to the returns of other projects that are …nanced through other loans.
Creditors lend money by way of standard debt contracts at t = 1. Creditors are risk neutral and operate in a perfectly competitive market. Without loss of generality we normalize the interest rate to i = 0.
7 Therefore, creditors expect to make zero expected pro…ts from lending. This is equivalent to assuming that the borrower makes a take-it-orleave-it repayment o¤er to a single creditor for each loan j, promising to repay r j at t = 2 for each unit borrowed at t = 1. 8 For notational simplicity, we stipulate that the borrower accepts to be …nanced only when expecting to obtain strictly positive expected payo¤.
According to our accounting convention, the borrower's repayment obligation comprises principal as well as net interest-this repayment obligation can be interpreted as the gross interest rate, given our normalization of the investment outlay to 1.
6 See Section 3. 7 To see that I = 1 and i = 0 are innocuous normalizations, suppose that the investment outlay is equal to I and that the creditors'rate of time preference (or required interest rate) is i > 0. Denoting the random cash ‡ow by R i , the project's return in the model can be reinterpreted in terms of percentage gross return for each unit of period-2 equivalent outlay: r i = R i =[I(1 + i)]. Thus, it is without loss of generality to set I = 1 and i = 0.
8 Thus, for the case in which each loan (or company) is …nanced by multiple creditors, we implicitly assume that there are no coordination failures across the creditors who syndicate the same loan.
On each loan, the borrower repays the creditor in full when the total realized return of the projects pledged is su¢ cient to cover the promised repayment, r j . If instead the total realized return falls short of the repayment obligation, the borrower defaults and the ownership of the projects'realized returns is transferred to the creditor. Due to bankruptcy costs, following default the creditor is able to recover only a fraction of the returns. The remaining fraction 1 of the returns is lost. The bankruptcy recovery rate 2 [0; 1] measures the e¢ ciency of bankruptcy and is industry speci…c.
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Note that the debt contract posited here is the optimal contractual arrangement if we assume that returns are privately observed by the borrower and can be veri…ed only at a cost (equal to the bankruptcy cost), as in the costly state veri…cation model of Townsend (1978) and Gale and Hellwig (1985) . See Appendix B for an alternative derivation of the optimality of the debt contract in a dynamic version of our model developed along the lines of Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and Hart and Moore (1998) .
The borrower's problem analyzed here can be equivalently reinterpreted in terms of a company's decision to merge with (or spin o¤ from) another company. Suppose that a borrower can assign its projects to di¤erent limited liability companies set up at no cost, and then seek independent …nancing for the projects assigned to each company. All the projects allocated to the same company are …nanced jointly, but independently from projects …nanced in the other companies set up by the same borrower. In this equivalent reformulation, the borrower's problem is to decide how to group projects into companies.
Two Identical and Independent Projects
This section analyzes the simplest possible speci…cation of the model with n = 2 identically and independently distributed projects. Each project i yields a low return r i L r L with probability 1 p i 1 p and a high return r i H r H > r L with probability p i p. We proceed by …rst examining the conditions for when the borrower is able to …nance the two projects separately and jointly (Section 2.1). Second, we compare the pro…tability of separate and joint …nancing, when they are both feasible (Section 2.2). Third, we illustrate that separate …nancing can be easily optimal for empirically plausible parameter values (Section 2.3). Finally, we derive a set of comparative statics predictions for the occurrence of joint and separate …nancing (Section 2.4).
Financing Conditions
Consider …rst the possibility of …nancing the two projects through two separate nonrecourse loans (or, equivalently, through two di¤erent limited liability companies). Given that the two projects are ex ante identical, when each of them is …nanced, …nancing will take place at the same equilibrium repayment rate (equal to the nominal repayment obligation). Such rate r i must satisfy r L < 1 < r i < r H , so that there is a positive probability that the loan is not repaid in full. Indeed, the …rm would not accept to be …nanced at a rate above r H , because this would result in zero payo¤ for the …rm. Also, the rate must be above 1 because at rates at or below 1 the creditor would make negative expected pro…ts (by obtaining a return never above the investment outlay of 1 and strictly below 1 with strictly positive probability) and therefore would not be willing to extend the loan.
In a competitive credit market, creditors make zero expected pro…ts. Thus, the repayment requested by the creditor is r i such that the gross pro…ts, pr i + (1 p) r L , are equal to the initial investment outlay 1. As a result, each project can be …nanced through a separate loan if and only if
Clearly, r i > 1.
Next, consider joint …nancing of the two projects through a single loan (or, equivalently, within the same company). Denote by r m the equilibrium repayment obligation per unit of investment, so that 2r m is the total repayment promised to investors in return for the initial …nancing of the two projects, 2I = 2. Two cases need to be distinguished, depending on whether or not the required repayment rate induces default when one project yields a high return while the other project yields a low return-this is the case with intermediate returns.
Suppose …rst that the equilibrium repayment rate r m is such that r L < r m < r H +r L 2 , so that there is no default with intermediate returns. As a result, the probability of default of the loan is reduced to (1 p) 2 . Substituting again in the expected creditor pro…ts, the borrower would only be able to obtain this rate in a competitive market if and only if
Suppose now that the equilibrium repayment rate r m is such that r H +r L 2 < r m < r H and therefore the borrower defaults in the event of a high and a low return. Hence, default occurs with probability 1 p 2 = (1 p) 2 + 2p(1 p). In a competitive credit market, this case arises if and only if
Since the borrower's expected pro…ts for a given distribution are decreasing in the equilibrium rate, if both conditions (2) and (3) are satis…ed, the borrower prefers rate r m to rate r m . 10 Summarizing the results so far, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Projects can be …nanced separately if and only if r i < r H , in which case the equilibrium repayment rate is r i . When the borrower seeks joint …nance, if
then the equilibrium rate is r m ; otherwise, the projects cannot be …nanced. Intuitively, joint …nancing steepens the return distribution around the center by inducing an anti-clockwise rotation.
10 It is straightfoward to show that if r m > (r H + r L )=2, then r m > (r H + r L )=2. Therefore, if it is not possible to obtain r m , then we can disregard the r m > (r H + r L )=2 constraint.
For any given repayment rate r, the net expected return for the borrower corresponds to the area above the cumulative distribution of (per-project) returns at r, F (r), and to the right of r (in blue). The gross expected return of the creditor is the sum of (i) the area above F (r) and to the left of r (in yellow) and (ii) the fraction of the area below F (r) and above the distribution function (in pink). The …rst area is equal to pr, which is the full repayment of the outstanding obligation multiplied by the probability that the project stays a ‡oat, p. The second area is equal to (1 p) r L , capturing the expected returns obtained in case of bankruptcy. The remaining fraction 1 of the pink area is equal to the expected bankruptcy costs. This is also equal to the di¤erence between the net present value of the company, the area above the distribution function and below 1, and the sum of creditor's and borrower's pro…ts.
The equilibrium rate r in the three panels is such that the gross expected return of the creditor is equal to 1. Projects can be …nanced separately as long as the creditor's gross returns at a rate r H are greater than 1, as in Panel (a). Projects can be …nanced jointly at a rate below the crossing point as long as the per-project creditor returns at (r H + r L )=2
are greater than 1, as in Panel (b). Projects can only be …nanced jointly at a rate above the crossing point if the per-project creditor returns at (r H + r L )=2 are lower than 1 and at r H are greater than 1, as in Panel (c).
Good and Bad Conglomeration
When both separate and joint …nancing are feasible, which one should the borrower choose?
Obviously, in the absence of bankruptcy costs (i.e., when = 1) the borrower is indi¤erent between …nancing the projects separately or jointly. The next proposition states the gains and losses when < 1.
Proposition 2 When the borrower can …nance both projects separately and jointly:
(a) If the joint rate is r m , then the borrower should …nance the projects jointly because of the co-insurance e¤ect. The per-project incremental surplus for the borrower of joint rather than separate …nancing is p (1 p) (1 )r L .
(b) If the joint rate is r m , then the borrower should …nance the projects separately because of the risk contamination e¤ect. The per-project incremental surplus for the borrower of separate rather than joint …nancing is p (1 p) (1 )r H . Figure 1 : Distribution of Returns. The area above the distribution function represents the project's expected return. For a given repayment rate r, the net expected return for the borrower corresponds to the area above the distribution function and to the right of r (in blue). The gross expected return for the creditor is the sum of (i) the area above F (r) and to the left of r (in yellow) and (ii) the fraction of the area below F (r) and above the distribution function (in pink). The equilibrium rate r is such that the gross expected return for the creditor is equal to 1. Intuitively, when the borrower obtains a rate that avoids intermediate bankruptcy, the probability of default under joint …nancing is lower than under separate …nancing.
The low-return project is saved from default when the other project yields a high return, thereby reducing the ine¢ ciency associated with bankruptcy. Per-project expected savings when the projects are …nanced jointly rather than separately-the "co-insurance e¤ect"-are equal to the probability that the …rst project yields a low return while the second project yields a high return, p(1 p), multiplied by the avoided losses due to bankruptcy costs, (1 )r L . Graphically, per-project savings due to the co-insurance e¤ect associated with joint …nancing are represented by a fraction (1 ) of the red area in Panel (a) of If, instead, the borrower obtains a joint rate that does not avoid intermediate bankruptcy, a low-performing project drags down the other, increasing the probability of default. Per-project expected losses when projects are …nanced jointly rather than separatelythe "risk contamination e¤ect"-are equal to the probability that the …rst project yields a high return while the second project yields a low return, p(1 p), multiplied by the additional losses in bankruptcy costs incurred, (1 )r H . Graphically, the per-project costs due to the risk contamination e¤ect associated with joint …nancing are represented The key question is whether the equilibrium repayment rate for joint …nancing is below or above the crossing point, (r H + r L ) =2. In conclusion, joint …nancing is optimal in case (a) when condition (2) is satis…ed-otherwise separate …nancing is optimal.
Notice that the crossing point is not necessarily at the mean. In particular, if p > 1=2, so that the distribution is skewed to the left (negatively skewed), the crossing point is below the mean. As a result, equilibrium rates above the crossing point are consistent with a probability of default below 50%. The resulting default probabilities would be 1 p for separate …nancing and 1 p 2 for joint …nancing, which for p high enough may be very low, as illustrated in the following numerical example.
Illustration
We now present an illustration of how conglomeration can result in an increase in expected bankruptcy costs for empirically plausible parameter values. To this end, Figure 3 calibrates the four parameters of our baseline model (r H , r L , p, and ) using representative values obtained from the empirical literature. To identify our four parameters,
we use the probability of bankruptcy, the internal rate of return, the loss given default, and the bankruptcy recovery rate. The key assumption for this calibration exercise is CALIBRATED VARIABLE PARAMETRIZATION 1. Probability of bankruptcy 1 p 2. Internal rate of return (IRR)
3. Bankruptcy recovery rate 4. Bankruptcy costs as a fraction of …rms'value prior to default Longsta¤ et al. (2005) : BBB-rated …rms, 5 year horizon (10%) 0:10 2. IRR rules: go ahead if IRR >10-15% (depending on risk) 0:175 3. Alderson and Betker (1995) (65%) 0:65 4. Altman (1984) : 11-17% of …rms'value up to 3 years before default 0:10 
Comparative Statics Predictions
We now derive comparative statics predictions with respect to changes in the characteristics of the projects: the recovery rates and the distribution of returns (mean, variability, and skewness). For each attribute, we study whether separate or joint …nancing is optimal for a larger range of the remaining parameters. Again, the key aspect is whether it becomes easier or more di¢ cult to obtain a repayment rate for joint …nancing below the crossing point. In turn, this depends on how parameter changes a¤ect the crossing point as well as the amount the …rm can pledge to the creditors at that point.
Prediction 1 For lower bankruptcy costs (higher ) then (a) …nancing, both jointly and separately, can be obtained for a larger region of parameters and (b) joint …nancing is preferred for a larger region of the remaining parameters.
A lower bankruptcy cost increases the maximum pledgeable income both jointly and separately since the recovered returns in case of default are higher. With joint …nancing, this is represented in Figure 4 (a) as a lower discount in the pink area.
Prediction 2 For higher probability of high return (higher p) then (a) …nancing can be obtained for a larger region of parameters, both jointly and separately and (b) joint …nancing is optimal for a larger region of the remaining parameters.
If the probability of a high return increases it becomes easier to …nance the project as well as to …nance at a repayment rate that avoids intermediate bankruptcy. Graphically, this lowers all the horizontal lines in the graph increasing the expected value, the area above the distribution. Financing is eased and, in particular, …nancing at a rate that avoids intermediate bankruptcy is eased because the maximum expected return pledgeable to creditors (the sum of the yellow area, the red area, and a fraction 1 of the pink area) also increases.
Neither the bankruptcy recovery rate nor the probability of success a¤ect the crossing
Changes in the variability of the project's return instead also a¤ect the crossing point when the distribution of returns is asymmetric, p 6 = 1=2.
Prediction 3 Consider the e¤ect of a mean-preserving spread in the project's return consisting in an increase in the high return r H and a reduction in the low return r L so as to maintain the mean return constant. Then, there exists p < 1=2 such that the region of parameters for which separate …nancing is optimal increases if and only if p > p.
To derive this result, …rst consider the e¤ect of a mean preserving spread for the special case with a symmetric distribution (p = 1=2). In this case, the mean preserving spread consists in an increase in r H exactly equal to the reduction in r L . While the crossing point is clearly una¤ected, according to equation (2), the joint …nancing rate that avoids intermediate bankruptcy becomes more di¢ cult to obtain. Thus, a mean preserving spread in the distribution of returns tends to favor separate …nancing. Indeed, low returns are even lower and therefore the pledgeable returns before the crossing point are lower. In the graph, the pink area, and therefore the area to the right of the crossing point, shrinks.
Turning to the case of asymmetric distributions, p 6 = 1=2, a mean-preserving spread also a¤ects the crossing point, (r H + r L )=2. If the distribution of returns is negatively skewed and therefore the mean is higher than the crossing point (p > 1=2), the crossing point is decreased. Indeed, to maintain the mean constant, a given increase in r H must be combined with a larger decrease in r L , resulting in a reduction in the crossing point.
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Thus, it becomes even more di¢ cult to obtain joint …nancing below the crossing point.
Thus, this second e¤ect also favors separate …nancing.
The sign of the second e¤ect is reversed if the distribution of returns is instead positively skewed (p < 1=2) and therefore the mean return lies below the crossing point. In this case, the two e¤ects go in opposite directions. If the distribution is su¢ ciently skewed (p < p < 1=2), the second e¤ect is stronger than the …rst. In the graph, the increase in the yellow area more than compensates the decrease in the pink area.
Prediction 4 Consider the e¤ect of a mean-preserving increase in negative skewness in the project's return consisting in a reduction in the low return level r L and an increase in the probability of high return p so as to maintain the mean return constant. Then, it becomes optimal to …nance the projects separately for a larger region of parameters if and only if the high return level r H is su¢ ciently large.
Consider …rst the case in which bankruptcy is extremely costly and the recovery rate is zero ( = 0). In this case, an increase in the negative skewness has two con ‡icting e¤ects. On the one hand, as r L decreases, the crossing point is reduced, so that joint …nancing at the rate avoiding intermediate bankruptcy becomes more di¢ cult. On the other hand, as p increases so as to keep the mean constant, the probability that both projects'returns are low is reduced, so that it becomes easier to …nance the projects at the rate avoiding intermediate bankruptcy. Graphically, the yellow area representing the creditor's expected returns at the crossing point is less wide (lower crossing point) but
higher (higher probability of staying a ‡oat).
Which of these two e¤ects dominates depends on the level of the high return r H . For a larger r H , the same reduction in the probability of high return p needs a higher reduction in 11 Formally, from r 0
the low return realization to ensure a constant mean. As a result, for the same increase in the probability of staying a ‡oat (height of the rectangle), we have a higher reduction in the crossing point (width of the rectangle). Hence, the increase in negative skewness makes it more di¢ cult to …nance the projects jointly at a repayment rate below the crossing point.
For the general case with a positive recovery rate > 0, there is a third e¤ect that makes it even more di¢ cult to …nance the projects at the rate avoiding intermediate bankruptcy because the increase in negative skewness reduces the recovered returns. Indeed, the pink area (the expected returns conditional on default) shrinks by becoming less wide (lower r L ) and less high (lower 1 p). Therefore, the threshold level of r H above which an increase in negative skewness favors separate …nancing decreases in .
Correlated Returns
We now consider the e¤ect of correlation in the joint distribution of returns. Suppose that the probability of having two high returns is equal to p [1 (1 p) (1 )], the probability of two low returns is equal to (1 p) [1 p (1 )], whereas the probability that one of the projects yields a high return whereas the other yields a low one is equal to p (1 p) (1 ).
In that case, would be the correlation coe¢ cient between the two projects. In order to be well-de…ned, it is necessary to assume that max h (1 p) =p; p=(1 p)i. Clearly, if = 0 we are back to the case with independent returns.
Proposition 3 If the correlation between the projects increases ( is larger), then separate …nancing is preferred for a larger set of parameters.
The probability of having two high returns and the probability of having two low returns increase simultaneously with . As a result, the repayment rate when intermediate bankruptcy is avoided is higher because the probability of two low returns is higher.
When intermediate bankruptcy cannot be avoided, instead, the repayment rate is lower because the probability of two high returns also increases. As a consequence, the …nancing conditions avoiding intermediate bankruptcy are tighter and those not avoiding it looser.
The e¤ects of correlation on the optimality conditions are also intuitive. In the extreme case in which one project has a high return the other necessarily has a low one (i.e., if = 1 and p = 1=2), projects can always be jointly …nanced at a rate that avoids intermediate bankruptcy. 12 Projects, therefore should always be …nanced jointly. As correlation increases above = 1, conglomeration is less likely to be optimal. If both projects are perfectly correlated ( = 1), the conditions for joint and separate …nancing are identical and the …rm is clearly indi¤erent between them.
Large Number of Projects
Consider a borrower with access to a large number of projects with independent returns.
We show that if the number of projects is su¢ ciently large, it always becomes possible for the borrower to …nance all the projects with a single loan. This result exploits the law of large numbers. Namely, as the number of projects n increases, the probability that the average number of projects with high returns di¤ers from p, the probability of a high return, by more than a small amount " tends to zero. We can then construct a rate o¤er to …nance all projects jointly that is acceptable for the creditors. The borrower's returns when …nancing all projects jointly is then arbitrarily close to the …rst best as the number of projects grows large. Therefore, for a large number of projects …nancing all the projects jointly is approximately optimal for the borrower, because it yields a payo¤ that is close to the highest possible level.
Proposition 4 There exists n 0 and q 2 (0; p) such that for n > n 0 a joint loan comprising all projects can be …nanced at a repayment rate that avoids bankruptcy when nq projects have high returns. The per-project return achieved in this way approaches the net present expected value of each project as n grows.
Heterogeneous Projects
In a recent paper, Leland (2007) stresses a di¤erent bene…t of …nancial separation from ours. Financial separation allows …rms with di¤erent return pro…les to choose di¤erent capital structures. We have abstracted so far from this e¤ect by assuming that projects are ex-ante symmetric. In this section, we extend the model to allow for heterogeneity across projects.
Financing Conditions
Focus on the case with n = 2 heterogeneous (and independently distributed) projects i = 1; 2. Project i yields returns r i H with probability p i and r 
Good and Bad Conglomeration
We now turn to the question of whether the borrower should …nance the projects jointly or separately when both …nancing modes are feasible. As in the symmetric case, if a rate that avoids bankruptcy in both intermediate situations can be obtained (case (a) in Proposition 5), then projects coinsure each other and therefore should be …nanced jointly.
If, instead, the …rm can only obtain a rate that does not avoid bankruptcy in any of the intermediate situations (case (c) ), then the projects should be …nanced separately because they drag down each other. If bankruptcy can only be avoided for the more favorable intermediate situation, then both co-insurance and contamination e¤ects are present at the same time. On the one hand, project 1, when it yields a high return, saves project 2 when project 2 yields a low return; on the other hand, project 1, when it yields a low return, contaminates project 2 when project 2 yields a high return. The optimality of separate or joint …nancing depends on whether the gains from co-insurance dominate the losses from risk contamination.
Proposition 6 If the borrower can …nance both projects separately and jointly, then (a) If the joint rate is r 0 m , then the borrower should …nance the projects jointly because of the co-insurance e¤ect. The gain in expected payo¤ from joint rather than separate Note that if the two projects have the same probability of success, then the risk contamination e¤ect always dominates the co-insurance e¤ect in case (b). With joint …nancing, the probabilities of saving and dragging down project 2 are the same but the co-insurance gains are outweighed by the contamination losses, because the project is saved when it has a low return but it is dragged down following a high return. Hence, separation is optimal unless a joint-…nancing rate that avoids bankruptcy with both intermediate returns can be obtained.
Comparative Statics Predictions
For the case in which one project is a mean preserving spread of the other, the next result establishes that more risk typically induces even more separation.
Prediction 5 If project 1 second-order stochastically dominates project 2, and therefore
" for " > 0, then projects should be …nanced separately unless the rate r 0 m can be obtained with joint …nancing. The region of parameters for which separation is optimal increases with the spread of the risky project.
The area in which joint …nancing is optimal shrinks as the spread of the risky project increases, as the condition for obtaining the rate r 
If both projects can be …nanced separately (p 2 r H + (1 p 2 ) r L 1 > 0) then they should be …nanced separately unless the rate joint rate r 0 m can be obtained (here r 00 m is never obtained, as there is only one level of intermediate returns). If, instead, the low-mean project has negative ex-post returns (p 2 r H + (1 p 2 ) r L 1 < 0), then this project cannot be …nanced separately. However, it might still be possible to …nance this project jointly with the high-mean project if a joint rate r 0 m can be obtained, as projects might save each other when they generate a low return. The borrower should indeed opt for joint …nancing rather than …nancing only the high-mean project if the co-insurance bene…ts more than compensate the ex-post negative returns of the low-mean project.
Ugly Conglomeration
We now turn to the managerial implications of our analysis. At …rst it seems plausible that (i) the …nancing option with the lowest repayment rate has the lowest likelihood of bankruptcy and (ii) the …nancing option with the lowest probability of bankruptcy is optimal. In this section, we show that these two rules of thumb are false in general. Figure 4 depicts the …nancing conditions and the repayment rates charged as a function of the recovery rate , for a given homogeneous combination of returns, r H and r L , and probability of high return, p. Separately, …nancing for each project can be obtained after the blue line threshold at the rate depicted by the brown line. Jointly, …nancing at a rate that does and does not avoid intermediate bankruptcy can be obtained after the red and green thresholds, respectively, at a repayment rate depicted by the black line.
Repayment Rates and Bankruptcy Probability
After the red threshold, the borrower obtains lower repayment rates with joint …nancing and, as we have seen before, joint …nancing is optimal. Nevertheless, below this threshold the loan rates are not necessarily lower with separate …nancing, although this is the optimal …nancing choice. The following proposition formalizes this result; borrowers should not always accept the loan with the lowest repayment rate.
Proposition 7 (Homogeneous) projects should be …nanced separately despite having higher repayment rates if and only if (i) the joint rate is r m and (ii) the separate rate is such that r i < r H .
Suppose that the borrower has the choice of …nancing the projects independently and jointly, although only at a rate with intermediate bankruptcy. In this region with bad conglomeration, the low return project drags down the high return one. The borrower should …nance the projects separately because the losses from bankruptcy are lower. However, if, at the same time, the returns recovered from a bankrupt high value project are higher than what the creditor can charge for separate loans ( r H > r i ), the creditor has higher returns if the projects are …nanced jointly, even though bankruptcy is more likely. As a result, the repayment rates are lower with joint than with separate …nancing. The borrower might feel tempted to …nance the projects jointly, but this is suboptimal. Low interest rate associated with joint …nancing here are deceptively attractive-while it might look good, conglomeration is bad. In this case, one could say that conglomeration is "ugly".
The holds if bankruptcy costs are su¢ ciently low. If the creditor breaks even at rate r i = r in the equilibrium with separate …nancing, the equilibrium rate with joint …nancing must be lower, so that r m < r i . In this case, equilibrium interest rate for joint …nancing is lower despite higher probability of bankruptcy. Intuitively, creditors can obtain higher expected proceeds from bankruptcy with joint …nancing, and so are forced by competition to o¤er lower interest rate-however, the borrower obtains higher expected payo¤ with separate …nancing at a higher interest rate.
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13 Note if the distribution of returns was continuous (rather than discrete, as in our model with binary returns), the extra losses from higher probability of bankruptcy if the equilibrium rate with joint …nancing was marginally above the crossing point will always be compensated by the increased proceeds from bankruptcy. Therefore, ugly conglomeration always appears when the project's returns are continuously distributed, because then there would be no discrete jump in the probability of bankruptcy at the crossing point (as there is with binary returns, for which ugly conglomeration therefore does not always arise).
Bankruptcy Probability and Optimal Conglomeration
Secondly, the option with the lowest probability of bankruptcy might not be optimal. This is due to the fact that, despite having a higher probability, the bene…ts of co-insurance might be outweighed by the costs of risk contamination.
Proposition 8 Separate …nancing is optimal even though it results in higher probability of bankruptcy if and only if (i) the joint rate is r 00 m and the contamination losses dominates co-insurance gains:
; and (ii) the probability of the former is lower than that of the latter (p 1 > p 2 ).
When the joint rate is r 00 m , we have that (i) if project 1 yields a low return, it drags down project 2's high return (that would have stayed a ‡oat with separate …nancing) and (ii) if project 1 yields a high return, it saves project 2's low return (that would have defaulted with separate …nancing).
On the one hand, with separate …nancing, the probability of default is reduced when project 1 fails and project 2 succeeds-as the now separate project 2 is not dragged down by the failing project 1, as instead would not have happened with joint …nancing. According to this …rst e¤ect, the probability of default with separate …nancing is reduced by (1 p 1 )p 2 compared to joint …nancing. On the other hand, with separate …nancing, the probability of default is increased when project 2 fails and project 1 succeeds-as the failing project 2 is not saved by the successful project 1, as instead would have happened with joint …nancing. According to this second e¤ect, the probability of default with separate …nancing is increased by p 1 (1 p 2 ) compared to joint …nancing. Overall, the probability of default with separate …nancing is higher than with joint …nancing if (1 p 1 )p 2 < p 1 (1 p 2 ), i.e., if p 2 < p 1 . Indeed, with joint …nancing project 2's probability of staying a ‡oat goes up from p 2 to p 1 , whereas project 1's probability is the same.
Despite this, it might still be that the risk contamination e¤ect dominates the coinsurance e¤ect, and therefore the projects should be …nanced separately. We have that
H is su¢ ciently high compared to r 2 L . Even though the probability of the co-insurance outcome is higher than that of risk contamination, if the level of bankruptcy costs conditional on default are su¢ ciently greater when project 2's return is high, the risk contamination losses outweigh the co-insurance gains.
Conclusion
This paper addresses the classic question of the value of conglomeration with bankruptcy costs. By focusing on the simplest setting with binary returns, qualify the long-standing claim that joint …nancing generates …nancial bene…ts by economizing on bankruptcy costs.
The same logic that allows conglomeration to create co-insurance savings in expected bankruptcy costs also results in additional risk contamination losses. We provide a full characterization of the conditions for which combining two (high-risk low-return) projects results in an increase in expected bankruptcy costs. We derive the following predictions:
An increase in the bankruptcy recover rate favors joint …nancing.
An increase in the probability of a high return favors joint …nancing.
An increase in the riskiness of (su¢ ciently negatively skewed) projects favors separate …nancing.
An increase in the negative skewness of projects (with su¢ ciently high return) favors separate …nancing.
An increase in the correlation of projects favors separate …nancing.
Joint …nancing of a su¢ ciently large number of independent projects is preferred.
In addition, our analysis uncovers additional advantages of separate …nancing when projects are heterogeneous. We also characterize situations in which projects should be …nanced in separate companies, even though this involves paying a higher interest rate than under joint …nancing. This is the case when the recovery rate in case of bankruptcy is su¢ ciently high, creditors are forced by competition to o¤er a more favorable interest rate for joint than separate …nancing. These results have clear implications for project …nance and securitization.
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3: Clearly, separate …nancing is not a¤ected by correlation. The joint …nancing repayment rates, r m and r m in Proposition 1, and the corresponding …nancing conditions, are now replaced by r m; and r m; , respectively, where
and
Note that r m; and r m; are respectively increasing and decreasing in . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: First statement. De…ne g( ) := r H +(1 ) r L . We have that g(p) > 1 because of the positive net present value condition, and trivially g(0) = r L < 1 and g 0 ( ) > 0. Then there exists a unique 2 (0; p) such that g( ) = 1. For a …xed rational number " (small) de…ne q := + ". Clearly,
Take any number of projects n such that nq is an integer number. Suppose that we were to …nance all these n projects jointly at an interest rate that avoids bankruptcy when at least nq of them have high returns. This is possible if and only if the per-project repayment satis…es
But, the creditor's zero pro…t condition implies that
where f (m) and F (m) are the probability density and distribution that m out of the n projects have high returns, i.e.
Given that the returns recovered in the event of bankruptcy are positive we have that
From the law of large numbers we have that F (nq) tends to 0 as n grows large (remembering that q < p). Therefore r n is bounded above by a number that is arbitrarily close to 1.
Given that qr H + (1 q) r L > 1, there exists n 0 such that for all n > n 0 then r n is such that r n qr H + (1 q) r L ;
as was to be shown.
Second statement: From the loan described above, the borrower obtains a per-project gross pro…t
Fix a small rational number " and an integer n such that n(p ") and n(p + ") are integer numbers. Then, given that q < p ", and that all terms in the …rst and in the second sum are positive, we have that
Given that the terms in the second factor in the sum are larger for larger k, the sum is reduced by replacing the summand of a given k by that of n(p "), the smallest term.
Then, rearranging,
From the law of large numbers, F [n(p + ")] F [n(p ")] tends to 1 as n grows. Indeed, from elementary statistics we know that
That is for n large, the gross per-project pro…t di¤ers from the (gross) present value of each project by an amount that is arbitrarily small, "(r H r L ). Similarly,
where is equal to …rst-best gross pro…ts,
Proof of Proposition 5:
Following the same procedure as in the symmetric case, the repayment rate should satisfy 1 < r 0 i < r i H . The creditor's zero pro…t condition is now
and project i can be …nanced (at r 0 i ) if and only if
There are three cases in which joint …nancing is feasible depending on whether bankruptcy can be avoided in both cases with intermediate returns, or only when project 1 yields a high return and 2 a low return, or in neither case. In the former case, competitive credit markets imply that
and therefore this is possible if and only if
If default can be avoided with high intermediate returns but not with low intermediate returns, then
If default cannot be avoided with either intermediate returns, then
where
Again, since the borrower obtains all the ex-post net present value, rate r 
Proof of Proposition 6: Substituting r 0 m in the right hand side of (A3) and r 0 i in the right hand side of (A1) and subtracting the latter from the former, we have
Similarly, substituting r 00 m in the right hand side of (A5) and subtracting again the ex-post net present value of …nancing the two projects separately from this, we obtain
which can be positive or negative. Lastly, substituting r 000 m in the right-hand side of (A6) and subtracting the ex-post net present value of …nancing the two projects separately from this, we have
Proof of Prediction 5: Given that one project is obtained from an elementary increase in risk from the other and returns should still be binary, we must have that p 1 = p 2 . Letting
As shown in the previous proposition, given that the probabilities of success are equal, we have that, when both projects can be …nanced separately as well as jointly, joint …nancing is only optimal if a rate r 0 m can be obtained. Moreover, the region for which joint …nancing is optimal shrinks as the repayment rate r 0 m is more di¢ cult to obtain if " increases. Indeed, the left-hand side of condition (A4) decreases in " and the repayment rate (the right-hand side) increases in ".
On the other hand, the region for which separate …nancing is possible expands if " increases. Indeed, the derivative of the left-hand side of condition (A2) is equal to whereas the right hand-side is equal to 1. Hence, this condition is more easily satis…ed as " increases. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Prediction
On the other hand, if we subtract this from the expected surplus from joint …nancing in the case in which the repayment rate r 0 m can be obtained and simplifying, we obtain
so that separate …nancing is optimal because both terms are negative.
Suppose that none of the two projects can be …nanced separately, if a rate r 0 m can be obtained, i.e. if condition (A4) is satis…ed, then from (A3), we have that the ex-post net present value of the joint combination is positive. On the other hand, it cannot be that a rate that does not avoid intermediate bankruptcy is obtained since (the second) inequality in (A4) implies that
which implies that the ex-post net present value is positive. This condition is equivalent to
which contradicts the fact that the two projects cannot be …nanced independently. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7:
To prove this, suppose …rst that a rate below the crossing point can be obtained. We have that
because 1 > r L . Suppose now that only a rate r m can be obtained and therefore the probability of bankruptcy is higher with joint …nancing. r m associated with joint …nancing is, nevertheless, lower than r i associated with separate …nancing whenever
or equivalently
Appendix B
Optimal Contracting with Non-Veri…able Returns
The debt contract we have adopted in this paper is the optimal …nancial arrangement in the "costly state veri…cation"model (see Townsend, 1978, and Gale and Hellwig, 1985) , when creditors can verify company returns at a cost equal to the bankruptcy cost. As it is well known, however, debt is no longer optimal when the possibility of renegotiation is introduced, because veri…cation is ex-post suboptimal in equilibrium.
This appendix revisits our analysis of conglomeration in an alternative model in which debt is not only the optimal …nancial arrangement, but is also robust to the introduction of renegotiation. This model is a two-project extension of Bolton and Scharfstein's (1990) dynamic model of debt with non-veri…able returns.
Suppose that (1) projects generate unveri…able returns not for one but potentially for two periods and (2) 14 Returns are not veri…able and therefore the borrower will repay nothing in the second (and last) period. In other words, R 2 j is a private bene…t for the borrower. Creditors, however, can induce a truthful report of the …rst period by committing (ex-ante) to provide additional funds at time 1. However, it is not possible to always guarantee extra funding, as R L < I + L =: I n . As in the baseline model, we assume away discounting and assume that the borrower has all the bargaining power.
When deciding whether to …nance the two projects separately or jointly, the borrower faces the following trade o¤. On the one hand, by …nancing the two projects jointly, the borrower can achieve the bene…ts of coinsurance. On the other hand, by …nancing each project separately in a stand-alone company, the borrower reduces the possibility of risk contamination, the phenomenon whereby a failing asset drags an otherwise healthy sponsoring …rm into distress. We assume that, when the projects are …nanced jointly, it is impossible to terminate one project without terminating the other or, equivalently, that a common re…nancing probability must be used. If this was not the case, then it would always be optimal to …nance the projects jointly as, at the very least, one could replicate the separate contracts. Indeed, if the projects are …nanced separately, one of them can be terminated without terminating the other and therefore separate re…nancing probabilities can be used. Finally, to abstract from the problems of internal …nancing, studied by Inderst and Müller (2003) , we assume that self-re…nancing is not possible.
We proceed by …rst deriving the optimal contracts for separate and joint …nancing, and then comparing the expected bene…ts of these two options. The proofs are collected at the end of the section.
Optimal Contracts
For each separate project, the borrower maximizes the expected surplus subject to the individual rationality and the incentive compatibility constraints. Denote as D 1 the payment at time 1 if a high return is announced and D 0 if a low is announced. Let the continuation probabilities be y 1 in case of a high announcement and y 1 in case of a low. The borrower's problem is given by M ax
where we are implicitly assuming that
Lemma 1 IC h and IR constraints are binding and y 1 = 1.
In the high state, it is better to have a higher continuation probability than a lower payment (better for e¢ ciency and for incentives). In contrast, in the low state, it might be better to have a low probability and a high payment to improve incentives. As stated in the IC h constraint, the di¤erence in probability should be high enough relative to the di¤erence in payments to induce truth-telling.
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Proposition 9 Assume that
then the optimal contract satis…es
To minimize ine¢ ciencies, the borrower tries to set the continuation probability in the low state as high as possible. With respect to the payments, it is optimal to have a high payment in the low state and a not so high payment in the high state. If the di¤erence is small, then the continuation probability di¤erence can also be small and therefore the probability of continuation in the low state can be high.
Similarly, the optimal contract for joint …nancing should maximize the borrower's expected surplus subject to individual rationality and the incentive compatibility constraints. 
where, we are again implicitly assuming that the limited liability (D 1;1
and the other IC constraints are satis…ed.
16
The following proposition outlines the optimal contract.
(1 y 1;1 ) = 0;
(1 y 1;0 ) as low as possible subject to
Note that in the case of independent projects we assumed that the limited liability constraint is satis…ed for the high repayment. Here we do not make that assumption a priori, but it must be checked that this condition holds.
Separate or Joint Finance?
Again, the expected ine¢ ciency might be greater by pooling the projects and therefore separation might be optimal. It is possible that a good and a bad realization ends up with a joint failure, whereas if the projects had been independent, the good one would have been saved. As opposed to the baseline model, a high and a low realization is not a sure failure but a strictly positive probability of failure. Still, for other parameter values, a good and a bad never go bankrupt, the bad one is saved by the high one with probability one. As a result, the expected ine¢ ciency is lower with joint projects and therefore they should be …nanced jointly.
For the comparison we will compare the ine¢ ciency arising from joint projects, denoted as A, and that from separation, denoted by B, where
16 We can easily check that 2 I + p
The comparison is driven by the previous proposition. If bankruptcy does not result following a high and a low realization, joint …nancing is optimal. If instead bankruptcy does result in that instance, separate …nancing might dominate.
Lemma 2 y 1;0 can be equal to 1 only if
This condition is more stringent (in terms of R H R L ) than condition (B8).
We analyze two cases, depending on whether this condition is satis…ed, always assuming that condition (B8) in Proposition 9 for …nancing independent projects holds. Note that in the baseline case the key to decide whether to bundle the projects was whether bankruptcy results when one project yields a high return and the other low return. Here, if the condition is satis…ed, the two projects are again saved when one of them yields a low return so that joint …nancing is optimal:
Proposition 11 If condition (B9) is satis…ed, then …nancing the projects jointly is optimal.
If, on the other hand, the condition is not satis…ed, then it might be that separation is optimal. To show this, we focus on the special case in which L is close to R 2 L . In this case, the condition in Proposition is equivalent to p < 2=3.
Proposition 12 If condition (B9) is not satis…ed, there are cases in which it is optimal to …nance the two projects separately. For example, if L is close to R 2 L and if the following two conditions are satis…ed
; separate …nancing is optimal if and only if
Proofs for Appendix B (1 y 1;0 ) 2p(1 p)(
n and then in the objective function, we have
Now, by increasing 
The IR can be written as
(1 (1 p) 2 ) + (1 p) 2 2L and therefore if y 1;0 is higher y 0;0 is higher and both the y 1;0 and y 0;0 terms increase the objective function. Provided that the condition on the statement of the proposition is true, we have that the numerator is positive. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2:
We have that y 1;0 can be equal to 1 only if D 1;0 < R H + R L , which simplifying is equivalent to 
and clearly if (B9) is satis…ed this is also satis…ed because this is less stringent.
Ex-ante ine¢ ciencies from joint …nancing are
Ex-ante ine¢ ciencies from separate …nancing are
Clearly B > A because B has higher numerator and a lower denominator than A.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 12: Substituting D 1;0 = R L +R H into the equation of the proposition, we have that
If we have that 0 < (1 y 1;0 ) < (1 y 0;0 ) < 1 and that D 1;1 < R H we have that the ex-ante ine¢ ciencies are
and, for the case of separate projects,
Clearly if L is close to R We now need to check that (1 y 1;0 ) > 0 (clearly, then (1 y 0;0 ) > 0). Substituting R 2 L = L in the expression above, we have that (1 y 1;0 ) > 0 as long as 2I
Similarly, we have that (1 y 0;0 ) < 1 (and therefore (1 y 1;0 ) < 1) if and only if (remember that we have (2 3p) > 0),
We also need that D 1;1 = (1 y 0;0 ) (
Notice that if we have that the left-hand side of (B13) is lower than the one of independent projects then, by assuming the latter the former becomes irrelevant. This is true if the second condition of the statement of the proposition is satis…ed, i.e. the second condition is equivalent to
It is easy to check that if the condition for the statement for separate projects is satis…ed then the (B14) also becomes irrelevant. Finally, it is easy to check that the condition on separation can be satis…ed simultaneously with (B14). Summarizing, it can indeed be that
and therefore all the conditions are satis…ed. Q.E.D.
